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The political and ethical challenge of multi-drug 
resistant tuberculosis 
Chris Degeling, Chris Mayes, Wendy Lipworth, Ian Kerridge, Ross Upshur (2015) 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article critically examines current responses to multi-drug resistant tuberculosis 
and argues that bioethics needs to be willing to engage in a more radical critique of 
the problem than is currently offered. In particular, we need to focus not simply on 
market-driven models of innovation and anti-microbial solutions to emergent and 
re-emergent infections such as TB. The global community also needs to address 
poverty and the structural factors that entrench inequalities—thus moving beyond 
the orthodox medical/public health frame of reference. 
 
 
 
The problem of drug-resistant tuberculosis 
 
Twenty years after tuberculosis (TB) was declared a global public health emergency, 
it remains a leading infectious cause of death worldwide.  TB also remains primarily a 
disease of poverty; higher rates of incidence follow in lock step with social and 
economic disadvantage.  Two billion people are known to be infected with 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis.  In its most recent report, The World Health 
Organization (2012) estimated that 8.6 million people develop TB each year and 1.3 
million people die from active infection – the vast majority amongst the poor and 
marginalized in low- and middle-income countries.   
 
Data from surveillance programs and drug resistance surveys suggests that almost 4 
percent of newly diagnosed cases and 20 percent of re-activated infections are 
caused by multi-drug resistant strains [MDR-TB] of the bacterium. About 630,000 
(roughly 10 percent) of these MDR-TB cases exhibit extensive drug resistance [XDR-
TB], which means that at least one of the two most potent first-line TB medications 
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and at least one of the three injectable second-line medications are no longer 
effective (Center for Disease Control 2013). Currently, less than half of identified 
MDR-TB patients are successfully treated – reflecting high mortality rates and 
discontinuation of treatment (World Health Organization 2012).  
 
It has been recognized since the 1950s that TB requires a combination of therapeutic 
agents because of the bacterium’s capacity to develop resistance. Drug resistant 
cases often require more than twenty months of access to second-line drugs (that 
can have serious side effects - especially when given to people who are also HIV 
positive). It is also known that the successful administration of these agents requires 
relative social, economic and political stability. The effects of inadequate socio-
political infrastructure and irrational prescribing, particularly the use of single 
agents, combine to present significant barriers to patients receiving and adhering to 
effective treatment, which can further foster resistance to therapeutic agents. MDR-
TB also has deleterious impacts on existing programs and structural resources. For 
example in South Africa the incidence of resistant strains is less than 3% of all TB 
cases. Yet efforts to treat these people consume about 35% of the budget allocated 
for TB control threatening the viability of established national programs (Pooran et 
al. 2013). Moreover the global emergence of socially dis-advantaged populations 
with XDR-TB who receive no institutional support and are consequently at large in 
their communities, indicates that XDR-TB is not only a significant risk to global health 
but an increasingly acute ethical and medico-legal challenge (Denholm et al. 2014; 
Selgelid 2008; Hughes, Cox, and Ford 2012).    
 
 
The innovation gap and the logic of market incentives 
 
Medications currently used in first-line treatment regimens for TB are more than 
fifty years old. While drug resistance has always been a concern (Daniels and Hill 
1952; Fleming 1945), TB has become increasingly drug resistant during this time, and 
it is now broadly accepted that the effective treatment of TB requires the 
development of new pharmaceutical agents that allow for shorter, simpler and more 
tolerable treatment regimens that can be used across a range of different contexts 
and settings (Stop TB Partnership 2006). Since the 1990s global efforts to overcome 
social and structural barriers to effective TB control have focused on the directly 
observed treatment short-course or DOTS strategy (World Health Organization 
2006).  However, it is now becoming clear that the reification of this simple 
standardised approach to TB diagnosis and treatment has harmed the development 
of locally appropriate programs. Indeed in some ways, DOTS has been in tension 
with, and, thereby, a hindrance to, on-the-ground efforts to deal with MDR-TB 
emergence (Keshavjee and Farmer 2012; Harper 2010). Experiences with 
implementing DOTS and our extensive knowledge of the biosocial and structural 
drivers of incidence and resistance tell us that a multilayered approach is necessary. 
Even as TB remains a disease of social disadvantage and deprivation, developing an 
effective armamentarium remains a pre-condition of sustainable progress in the 
fight against MDR-TB, especially in resource-poor and endemic settings (Zumla et al. 
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2014; Dheda et al. 2014).  
 
Yet despite the desperate need for new TB medicines and new ways of avoiding 
resistance, the TB drug pipeline is still considered to be fragile and thin (Ma et al. 
2010; Grosset, Singer, and Bishai 2012).  While spending on pharmaceuticals has 
been the fastest growing segment of healthcare budgets in most countries for 
decades (Danzon and Nicholson 2012), most large pharmaceutical companies have 
now left the antibiotic discovery field altogether in favour of developing drugs for 
more lucrative chronic diseases.  In this regard, it is sobering to realize that only 
sixteen drugs were developed between 1975 and 1999 for infectious diseases 
endemic in the world’s poorest countries, including TB, malaria, Chagas Disease and 
others (Trouiller et al. 2002).   
 
Even where they do exist, drug development and regulatory processes for TB are 
slow. For example, one new agent, Bedaquiline was first reported in Nature in 2005 
but only approved by the FDA in December 2012. Many new drugs are repurposed 
raising questions about their increased susceptibility to resistance, and completely 
novel agents have limited safety data. There is also a translation gap between clinical 
trial efficacy and program effectiveness and evidence of “real world” safety.  Indeed, 
it is arguable that rolling out medicines that may have significant adverse effects 
such as bedaquiline in the absence of adequate pharmacovigilance is a form of global 
malpractice.  Compounding this, patent issues make the necessary combination 
studies difficult, further delaying whatever “real world” impact a new drug may have 
by years (Wallis 2013).  And because research efforts are inevitably tied to 
pharmaceutical markets, the resulting culture of competition between industries, 
researchers, and institutions results in duplication of effort and data hoarding (So et 
al. 2012).  
 
There are two possible reasons to explain the limited development of new 
pharmacotherapies to treat tuberculosis: the science is too hard and/or there is a 
lack of commercial incentive for innovation—i.e. there is a clear failure of the market 
to address a public good (Breitstein and Spigelman 2013; Iseman 2007; Pogge 2007, 
2005; Theuretzbacher 2012).  There is evidence to support both of these 
possibilities. With respect to the science, the widespread adoption of genomic-based 
methods of target discovery for new antimicrobial agents has had limited success 
(Boucher et al. 2009; Livermore et al. 2011). And with respect to the way in which 
markets fail to attend to clear public needs, the potential market for new TB drugs is 
not attractive enough commercially to stimulate a corporate appetite for the risks of 
funding research and development.  Given the enormous global burden of disease, 
market size is clearly not the issue. Rather, the limiting factor is the relatively low 
price that the market can sustain. In this regard it is noteworthy that WHO 
recommends that TB drugs should be provided free of charge (World Health 
Organization 2006 9). The root cause of the inattention of markets to TB-related 
pharmacological research has been attributed both to poverty (insufficiently 
developed economies and mostly poor patients), and to intellectual property 
restrictions (patents), international trade agreements (e.g. TRIPS), and to systems of 
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research and research governance (Trouiller et al. 2002; Piddock 2012; Gathii 2005; 
Sonderholm 2010). Whatever the respective merits of these opposing arguments, 
the effect is the same.  
 
Attempts to boost innovation 
 
Proposed solutions to the lack of market incentive to address global unmet needs 
have come from within and outside the pharmaceutical industry and include both 
‘push’ and ‘pull’ mechanisms that either seek to decouple the cost of research from 
the need for shareholder profit, or reinforce existing intellectual property 
protections. Push mechanisms generally support research by reducing the costs and 
risks of research and development through global funds, government grants, public / 
private partnerships and philanthropy.  Other mechanisms include tax breaks for 
companies that undertake research on TB, or selectively fast-tracking regulatory 
approval by abridging or even scrapping regulatory requirements for demonstrating 
safety and efficacy (Piddock 2012).   
 
Pull mechanisms support research by guaranteeing the viability of a market for a 
new drug through pre-purchase agreements (which effectively subsidise access for 
disadvantaged populations), patent extensions or ‘wild-card’ patent trades whereby 
the company is rewarded for developing a new treatment by getting to keep a 
patent on another product [i.e. a blockbuster drug] of their choosing for longer than 
would otherwise be permitted (Ravvin 2008).  Other pull measures suggested 
include Pogge’s (2012)model of graded compensation from a Health Impact Fund, 
with the amount of money awarded being based on analysis of the reduction of the 
global burden of the disease attributable to the new products. This model has three 
components: (i) any effective drugs developed to treat neglected diseases are to be 
free of IP restrictions, diminishing price exclusion and access problems; (ii) the 
developers are then rewarded from a health fund, in proportion to the impact of the 
new agent on the global burden of disease – thereby generating and incentive for 
innovation and effective administration; and, (iii) the fund is supported by developed 
nations – based on prudential concerns such as lower prices on all essential 
medications in all markets, the economic value of biomedical research, and 
increasing global capacity to respond to health emergencies.  
 
Consistent with the history of pharmaceutical development push mechanisms have 
been the most subscribed, although pharmaceutical companies reportedly remain 
open to – or, less generously, are holding out for – highly commercially favourable 
pull mechanisms such as patent trade arrangements (Outterson, Samora, and Keller-
Cuda 2007). Public-private partnerships such as the Global TB Alliance, the Critical 
Path to TB Drug Regimens Initiative and The Gates Foundation-funded TB Drug 
Accelerator have had some success in bringing new drugs/agents to market (Zumla 
et al. 2014). The TB Alliance funded the development of Bedaquiline, which was 
approved by the FDA in December 2012 (the first novel drug since Rifampacin 1967).  
Delamanid was approved by the European Medicines Agency in November 2013 – 
notably, both of these drugs were approved after only Phase 2b trials.  The Global TB 
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Alliance is currently testing a 4-drug regimen for sensitive TB to reduce treatment 
periods from 6 to 4 months and testing bedaquiline in multi-agent combinations 
(Wraight 2012). Ten other drugs are in late stage clinical trials (although 6 of these 
are repurposed). There are also 10 candidate vaccines and 2 immunotherapeutic 
agents in late clinical trials (Abubakar et al. 2013).  
 
However, while there clearly has been some success, both industry insiders and 
external analysts agree that current approaches to incentivising drug development 
are not sufficiently enticing to the pharmaceutical industry (Hamad 2010; Osborne 
2013).  The numbers support the view that industry commitment is patchy at best.  
Total research funding for TB has fallen between 2010 and 2013 from US$660 to US 
$620 million (Burki 2014), and pharmaceutical companies have reduced their input 
by 22 percent, such that the private sector now contributes less than 20 percent of 
total R +D funding. Much of the cost of development is already borne by the public – 
through funding basic science in universities and charitable research foundations 
(Garattini and Chalmers 2009).  In addition, both push and pull mechanisms have 
met with prudential concerns, equity questions and competing consequentialist and 
libertarian objections, based on the erosion of established safety mechanisms and 
their potential to distort existing drug development pathways and pharmaceutical 
markets to produce perverse outcomes (Sonderholm 2010; Peterson, Hollis, and 
Pogge 2010). It seems, therefore, that existing approaches to overcoming market 
disinterest have had limited success and that we need new ways of conceptualising 
the problem of drug resistant TB. 
 
Reformulating the problem 
 
Leading experts point to recent progress in developing new agents, but agree that 
further effort is needed (Dheda et al. 2014; Zumla et al. 2014; Abubakar et al. 2013). 
We believe that this is where bioethics comes in, because it can offer important 
perspectives that are not tied to a particular solution and help us to keep what is 
ethically important in focus—promoting global equity by reducing poverty, 
optimising public health and preventing the spread of disease. Bioethics, as we 
understand it, is a field of critical inquiry characterised by methodological pluralism 
and capacity to identify and apply normative theories appropriate to the content and 
context of morally complex techno-social and socio-political issues (Dawson 2010; 
Bishop and Jotterand 2006). In Catherine Mills’s (2010 145) terms, a bioethics 
grounded in the “lived-realities and ethical practice everyday life” can remind us that 
MDR and XDR-TB are primarily products of human agency – ‘we have taken the 
curable and made it nearly incurable’ – and that we are collectively responsible for 
finding a solution (Pogge 2005; Farmer and Gastneau Campos 2004; Upshur, Singh, 
and Ford 2009).  More specifically, a critical bioethics can alert us to the possibility of 
more radical solutions to market disinterest, while at the same time helping us to 
balance the innovation imperative against the need to: 
 address structural issues, such as lack of universal health coverage, 
employment and education—measures that are arguably more effective than 
any new drug;  
6 | P a g e  
 
 ensure that innovative drugs are regulated, reimbursed and administered in 
such a way that safety and efficacy are assured, and resistance to new agents 
does not develop (thereby further entrenching health inequities); and 
 ensure that the needs of those currently infected with TB are not overlooked 
in the pursuit of longer term market and structural reforms. 
 
Rebooting innovation 
 
Existing approaches to enhancing innovation all start from assumptions that 
innovation must be market- rather than needs-driven (Williams 2012) and therefore 
all centre on either uncoupling the development of new pharmaceuticals and 
income from selling them (push mechanisms), or instituting measure that entrench 
profitable monopolies for private interests (pull mechanisms).  
 
In this paper, we argue that what is needed is not simply pushes and pulls, but rather 
a radical ‘rebooting’ of drug development pathways (Shlaes et al. 2013).  One 
alternative is to weaken the pharmaceutical industry’s privileged position as a 
gatekeeper to innovation (which remains the case even in the context of the public-
private partnerships described above) and instead find ways to attain broad 
institutional support for Open Science projects. These are large-scale enterprises 
that enable scientists and citizens to work through a free repository for biological 
and molecular data – such as that created by Collaborative Drug Discovery funded by 
NIH/BMGF, which has data on three hundred thousand compounds (Ekins and 
Williams 2014).  Citizen led research strategies have so far proved effective in 
physics, astronomy, environmental sciences, and geology. This research could be 
supported by cheap/free-ware Apps for data mining and predictive modelling and 
publications devoted to TB could be free (Médecins Sans Frontières Access 
Campaign 2012).   
This is not a new idea, but its realisation has been impeded by existing TRIPS system.  
As recently as 2012 Médecins Sans Frontières demanded, amongst other measures, 
the pooling of intellectual property to promote TB research (2012).  The World 
Health Organization rejected the application in December 2013, even though it is 
widely recognized that without access to a large library of compounds, then the 
majority of both industry-led and Open Science-based innovation will inevitably 
remain restricted to target-based research strategies (Osborne 2013; So et al. 2012). 
Another way to reboot innovation would be to institute new forms of taxation. In 
2011 Médecins Sans Frontières called for a financial transaction tax (FTT) to support 
global health initiatives, such as funding TB diagnosis, treatment and drug 
development. MSF’s call coincided with the proposal at the European Union for a 
FTT to create a fund to bailout the banking sector in case of another global financial 
crisis. The idea of the FTT, also known as the ‘Robin Hood Tax’, is to impose a small 
tax (between 0.01% and 0.1%) on financial transactions between financial 
institutions. MSF argued that the accumulated funds should be used to “bailout” 
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global health. Although widely popular among EU citizens, only 11 member states 
agreed to participant and the proposal is currently stalled.  
The popularity of FTTs as measure to address global inequality is further reflected in 
the unexpected celebration of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century. Piketty 
argues that wealth inequality in the 21st century might reach or surpass the 
oligarchic levels of the 19th century. Following earlier proposals from economists 
such as James Tobin and Joseph Stiglitz, Piketty seeks to democratise wealth via 
‘progressive global tax on capital’, he claims ‘[s]uch a tax would provide a way to 
avoid an endless inegalitarian spiral and to control the worrisome dynamics of global 
capital concentration’ (Piketty 2014 360). The implementation of this tax would 
require unprecedented international cooperation, which Piketty is not optimistic 
about. However, in acknowledging the utopian features of his proposal, Piketty 
suggests it can be used as an aspirational ideal and reference point to measure 
alternate proposals.   
 
Bioethicists could draw on the current popularity of Piketty among publics and 
politicians to call for a global tax that targets the pharmaceutical industry. The tax 
would be hypothecated to attend to therapeutic and structural needs of MDR and 
XDR-TB. A global tax on Pharma, whether the target is revenue or non-TB R&D, 
would produce a sizeable fund that could be put towards development of MDR and 
XDR-TB therapies as well as providing assistance and incentives to developing 
countries for structural reform in education, infrastructure and healthcare. 
Additional levies could be placed on tissue and biological specimen exportation and 
a reputational tithe on researchers in high income nations who get tenure on data 
derived from low income nations.  
 
While the pharmaceutical industry might not embrace such a proposal, a number of 
factors could see it gain some traction where the FTT did not. First, unlike the FTT, 
the tax would be global and therefore would not affect competition. Pharmaceutical 
companies could not remove themselves from one tax jurisdiction and move to a 
more favourable one. Second, a global tax might limit the opportunities for 
pharmaceutical companies to seek tax havens—something that has been 
enormously frustrating to countries like the United States.  Third, a global pharma 
tax would be consistent with moves to reduce global wealth inequality and increase 
social justice. In this regard it is noteworthy that citizens within the EU gave 
significant support to the FTT, suggesting that a wider global population may also be 
supportive of a tax scheme to address TB and global health inequalities.  
 
Beyond innovation 
 
In addition to prompting radical thinking about global markets in pharmaceuticals, 
when bioethics is grounded in peoples’ lived realities it also reminds us that 
biomedical innovation is only a partial solution to the problem of drug-resistant TB. 
Upshur has argued that the emergence of XDR-TB is a rupture in the narrative of 
biomedical progress that dominates medicine and bioethics (Upshur, Singh, and Ford 
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2009). It is thus necessary to keep in mind the limits of positivistic scientific solutions 
to social, political and economic problems and step beyond the bounded reasoning 
of market mechanisms and individually oriented interventions.  Therefore, whether 
funds for TB are derived from a Piketty-like tax, the MSF’s FTT or crowd sourced, it is 
important that they be used to develop new therapeutic agents, locally appropriate 
mechanisms of implementation and address poverty and structural factors such as 
lack of universal access to health care, education and housing. To do this, we may 
consider incentivising innovation in other domains such as environmental 
engineering, housing design and urban planning, with a focus on mitigating poverty 
and preventing the spread of infection. 
 
It is also important to bear in mind that market disinterest extends to the ways in 
which medicines are paid for, and the ways in which they are prescribed. Everyone 
accepts, in principle, that new agents and regimens for TB must be accessible and 
affordable to those who need them, and administered appropriately to avoid 
resistance. But support for programs that aim to achieve this are not priorities for 
companies who simply want to get their products to market, and are also highly 
dependent upon political and social climates.   
 
At the same time, a balance must be found between the need to improve treatment 
of patients who are currently infected with TB, and the need to research and 
develop new agents, and control access to the most effective regimens so that 
resistance does not develop (Kesselheim and Outterson 2010).  This is a delicate 
situation. For if we do not move beyond DOTS and fail to adequately attend to the 
economic and structural conditions that enable effective administration of 
therapeutic agents, it is likely that XDR-TB will develop a resistance to new therapies 
and result in a situation in which pathogens have established resistance to all 
available anti-microbials (Raviglione 2006). However, if new therapies are 
developed, but we refuse to administer them until adequate infrastructure is 
established, then we abandon those currently infected to suffering and death 
(Farmer 2003 199).  
 
Conclusion 
If we are to address the problem of drug resistant TB, then we need to be willing to 
engage in a more radical critique of the problem than is currently offered. In 
particular, we need to focus not simply on market-driven models of innovation and 
anti-microbial solutions to emergent and re-emergent infections such as TB.  We also 
need to address poverty and the structural factors that entrench inequalities—thus 
moving beyond the orthodox medical/public health frame of reference. At the same 
time, we need to ensure new medicines are safe, available to those who need them, 
and administered in such a way that resistance does not develop, all while 
considering the needs of existing patients. Bioethics can help in this complex 
situation, but only if it radically rejects the notion that MDR-TB is ‘business as usual’. 
 
  
9 | P a g e  
 
 
Disclosure of Competing Interests and Funding 
No competing interests to declare.  This research was in part funded by the NHMRC 
CRE for TB Control [CRE1043225].  Funding agencies had no role in study design, 
data collection, analysis and interpretation, or in the writing of the article. 
 
 
References 
 
Abubakar, I., M. Zignol, D. Falzon, M. Raviglione, L. Ditiu, S. Masham, I. Adetifa, N. 
Ford, H. Cox, and S. D. Lawn. 2013. "Drug-resistant tuberculosis: time for 
visionary political leadership." The Lancet infectious diseases no. 13 (6):529-
539. 
Bishop, J. P., and F. Jotterand. 2006. "Bioethics as biopolitics." Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy no. 31 (3):205-212. 
Boucher, H. W., G. H. Talbot, J. S. Bradley, J. E. Edwards, D. Gilbert, L. B. Rice, M. 
Scheld, B. Spellberg, and J. Bartlett. 2009. "Bad bugs, no drugs: no ESKAPE! 
An update from the Infectious Diseases Society of America." Clinical 
Infectious Diseases no. 48 (1):1-12. 
Breitstein, J., and M. Spigelman. 2013. "The Role of Product Development 
Partnerships in Advancing the Development of Drugs for Unmet Needs." Clin 
Pharmacol Ther no. 93 (6):468-470. doi: 10.1038/clpt.2013.53. 
Burki, T. 2014. "Improving the health of the tuberculosis drug pipeline." The Lancet 
Infectious Diseases no. 14 (2):102-103. 
Center for Disease Control. 2013. TB Elimination: Extensively Drug-Resistant 
Tuberculosis (XDR TB). In CDC Fact sheet. 
http://www.cdc.gov/tb/publications/factsheets/drtb/mdrtb.htm: Center for 
Disease Control. 
Daniels, M., and A. B. Hill. 1952. "Chemotherapy of pulmonary tuberculosis in young 
adults." British medical journal no. 1 (4769):1162. 
Danzon, P. M., and S. Nicholson. 2012. "Introduction." In The Oxford Handbook of 
the Economics of the Biopharmaceutical Industry, edited by P.M. Danzon and 
S. Nicholson, 1-19. Oxford University Press, USA. 
Dawson, A. 2010. "The future of bioethics: three dogmas and a cup of hemlock." 
Bioethics no. 24 (5):218-225. 
Denholm, J., J. Amon, R. O'Brien, A. Narain, S. Kim, A. El Sony, and M. Edginton. 
2014. "Attitudes towards involuntary incarceration for tuberculosis: a survey 
of Union members." The International Journal of Tuberculosis and Lung 
Disease no. 18 (2):155-159. 
Dheda, K., T. Gumbo, N. R. Gandhi, M. Murray, G. Theron, Z. Udwadia, G. B. Migliori, 
and R. Warren. 2014. "Global control of tuberculosis: from extensively drug-
resistant to untreatable tuberculosis." The Lancet Respiratory Medicine no. 2 
(4):321-338.  
Ekins, S., and A. J. Williams. 2014. "Curing TB with open science." Tuberculosis no. 94 
(2):183-185. 
10 | P a g e  
 
Farmer, P. 2003. Pathologies of power: Health, human rights, and the new war on 
the poor. Vol. 444. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Farmer, P., and N. Gastneau Campos. 2004. "New Malaise: Bioethics and Human 
Rights in the Global Era." The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics no. 32 
(2):243-251. 
Fleming, A. 1945. Penicillin - Nobel Lecture. Nobel Media [cited 12 June 2014. 
Available from 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1945/fleming-
lecture.html. 
Garattini, S., and I. Chalmers. 2009. "Patients and the public deserve big changes in 
evaluation of drugs." BMJ no. 338. doi: 10.1136/bmj.b1025. 
Gathii, J. T. 2005. "Third world perspectives on global pharmaceutical access." In 
Ethics and the Pharmaceutical Industry in the 21st Century, 336-351. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Grosset, J. H., T. G. Singer, and W. R. Bishai. 2012. "New drugs for the treatment of 
tuberculosis: hope and reality " The International Journal of Tuberculosis and 
Lung Disease no. 16 (8):1005-1014. doi: 10.5588/ijtld.12.0277. 
Hamad, B. 2010. "The antibiotics market." Nature Reviews Drug Discovery no. 9 
(9):675-676. 
Harper, I. 2010. "Extreme condition, extreme measures? Compliance, drug 
resistance, and the control of tuberculosis." Anthropology & Medicine no. 17 
(2):201-214. doi: 10.1080/13648470.2010.493606. 
Hughes, J., H. Cox, and N. Ford. 2012. "Sanatoria for drug-resistant tuberculosis: an 
outdated response." The Lancet no. 379 (9832):2148. 
Iseman, M. 2007. "Extensively drug-resistant Mycobacterium tuberculosis: Charles 
Darwin would understand." Clinical Infectious Diseases no. 45 (11):1415–6. 
Keshavjee, S., and P. E. Farmer. 2012. "Tuberculosis, Drug Resistance, and the 
History of Modern Medicine." New England Journal of Medicine no. 367 
(10):931-936. doi: doi:10.1056/NEJMra1205429. 
Kesselheim, A. S., and K. Outterson. 2010. "Fighting Antibiotic Resistance: Marrying 
New Financial Incentives To Meeting Public Health Goals." Health Affairs no. 
29 (9):1689-1696. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2009.0439. 
Livermore, D. M., M. Blaser, O. Carrs, G. Cassell, N. Fishman, R. Guidos, S. Levy, J. 
Powers, R. Norrby, and G. Tillotson. 2011. "Discovery research: the scientific 
challenge of finding new antibiotics." Journal of antimicrobial chemotherapy 
no. 66 (9):1941-1944. 
Ma, Z., C. Lienhardt, H. McIlleron, A. J. Nunn, and X. Wang. 2010. "Global 
tuberculosis drug development pipeline: the need and the reality." The 
Lancet no. 375 (9731):2100-2109.  
Médecins Sans Frontières Access Campaign. 2012. Test Me, Treat Me: A Drug-
Resistant TB Manifesto. Médecins Sans Frontières [cited 12 June 2014]. 
Available from https://www.msfaccess.org/TBmanifesto/. 
Mills, C. 2010. "Continental Philosophy and Bioethics." Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 
no. 7 (2):145-148. 
Osborne, R. 2013. "First novel anti-tuberculosis drug in 40 years." Nature 
Biotechnology no. 31 (2):89-91. 
11 | P a g e  
 
Outterson, K., J. B. Samora, and K. Keller-Cuda. 2007. "Will longer antimicrobial 
patents improve global public health?" The Lancet infectious diseases no. 7 
(8):559-566. 
Peterson, M., A. Hollis, and T. Pogge. 2010. "A Critique in Need of Critique." Public 
Health Ethics no. 3 (2):178-185. doi: 10.1093/phe/php037. 
Piddock, L. J. V. 2012. "The crisis of no new antibiotics—what is the way forward?" 
Lancet Infectious Disease no. 12:249-53. 
Piketty, T. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-first Century. Translated by Arthur 
Goldhammer: Harvard University Press. 
Pogge, T. 2005. "Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program." 
Metaphilosophy no. 36 (1-2):182-209. 
Pogge, T. 2007. "Montreal Statement on the human right to essential medicines." 
Cambridge Quarterly on Healthcare Ethics no. 16 (1):97-108. 
Pogge, T. 2012. "The Health Impact Fund: Enhancing Justice and Efficiency in Global 
Health." Journal of Human Development and Capabilities no. 13 (4):537-559. 
doi: 10.1080/19452829.2012.703172. 
Pooran, A., E. Pieterson, M. Davids, G. Theron, and K. Dheda. 2013. "What is the cost 
of diagnosis and management of drug resistant tuberculosis in South Africa?" 
PloS one no. 8 (1):e54587. 
Raviglione, M. 2006. "XDR-TB: entering the post-antibiotic era? [Editorial]." The 
International Journal of Tuberculosis and Lung Disease no. 10 (11):1185-1187. 
Ravvin, M. 2008. "Incentivizing Access and Innovation for Essential Medicines: A 
Survey of the Problem and Proposed Solutions." Public Health Ethics no. 1 
(2):110-123. doi: 10.1093/phe/phn017. 
Selgelid, M. J. 2008. "Ethics, Tuberculosis and Globalization." Public Health Ethics no. 
1 (1):10-20. doi: 10.1093/phe/phn001. 
Shlaes, D. M., D. Sahm, C. Opiela, and B. Spellberg. 2013. "The FDA Reboot of 
Antibiotic Development." Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy no. 57 
(10):4605-4607. 
So, A. D., Q. Ruiz-Esparza, N. Gupta, and O. Cars. 2012. "3Rs for innovating novel 
antibiotics: sharing resources, risks, and rewards." BMJ-British Medical 
Journal no. 344 (3):e1782. 
Sonderholm, J. 2010. "Ethical Issues Surrounding Intellectual Property Rights." 
Philosophy Compass no. 5 (12):1107-1115. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-
9991.2010.00358.x. 
Stop TB Partnership. 2006. The Global Plan to Stop TB. Geneva, Switzerland World 
Health Organization. 
Theuretzbacher, U. 2012. "Accelerating resistance, inadequate antibacterial drug 
pipelines and international responses." International Journal of Antimicrobial 
Agents no. 39:295-299. 
Trouiller, P., P. Olliaro, E. Torreele, J. Orbinski, R. Laing, and N. Ford. 2002. "Drug 
development for neglected diseases: a deficient market and a public-health 
policy failure." The Lancet no. 359 (9324):2188-2194. 
Upshur, R., J. Singh, and N. Ford. 2009. "Apocalypse or redemption: responding to 
extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis." Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization no. 87 (6):481-483. 
12 | P a g e  
 
Wallis, R. S. 2013. "Sustainable Tuberculosis Drug Development." Clinical Infectious 
Disease no. 56 (1):106-13. 
Williams, O. D. 2012. "Access to medicines, market failure and market intervention: 
A tale of two regimes." Global Public Health no. 7 (sup2):S127-S143. doi: 
10.1080/17441692.2012.725753. 
World Health Organization. 2006. The Stop TB Strategy: Building on and Enhancing 
DOTS to Meet the TB-related Millennium Development Goals. Geneva: World 
Health Organization. 
World Health Organization. 2012. Global tuberculosis report 2012. Geneva: World 
Health Organization. 
Wraight, S. 2012. "The future of TB treatment: trial shows potential for a new TB 
drug." Future Microbiol no. 7 (9):1033. 
Zumla, A. I., S. H. Gillespie, M. Hoelscher, P. P. J. Philips, S. T. Cole, I. Abubakar, T. D. 
McHugh, M. Schito, M. Maeurer, and A. J. Nunn. 2014. "New antituberculosis 
drugs, regimens, and adjunct therapies: needs, advances, and future 
prospects." The Lancet Infectious Diseases no. 14 (4):327-340.  
 
 
